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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
ONE 1983 PONTIAC, (JOE ARAVE), 
Defendant/Respondent. 
Case No. 20575 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State of Utah sought a forfeiture of a 1983 Pontiac on 
the basis that it had been used in the transportation of 
narcotics, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §58-37-13, 1953 (as 
amended). The District Court denied that forfeiture. Whether 
the lower court abused it's discretion in disallowing the 
forfeiture of the vehicle. 
DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT 
The lower court heard argument and evidence on the State's 
petition. In a memorandum decision dated February 14, 1985, the 
Honorable VeNoy Christofferson, District Court Judge, ruled that 
the vehicle should not be forfeited. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent desires that the lower court's decision be 
affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
In August of 1984, Joe Arave was the owner of a 1983 black 
Pontiac Firebird automobile, whose value was approximately 
$10,000. On two occasions, in August and September of 1984, 
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-2-
Arave was approached by undercover narcotics officers. These 
officers had befriended Arave who was using cocaine and he gave 
them a small quantity thinking they were his friends. (T.p. 
20-25) There was evidence that any profit motive was involved 
and it was questionable whether the cocaine was for sale or 
merely possession for Mr. Arave's own use and for the use of 
someone that he thought was his friend. (See Record on Appeal, 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.) 
The State filed a complaint for forfeiture pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated §58-37-13 on September 20, 1984, and an answer to 
said complaint was filed on October 18, 1984. The matter was not 
set for a hearing until February 8, 1985. The hearing on the 
forfeiture was held before any criminal trial resulting in a 
conviction or plea of guilty in the criminal case which arose 
from the alleged sale of cocaine. (See Record on Appeal) 
The hearing included testimony from the two undercover narcotics 
officers, Scott Crawford and Fred Olson, and Joe Arave. 
Uncontroverted evidence was also received, that Arave had taken a 
loan at Zion's First National Bank to repair and rebuild the 1983 
Pontiac. Although the bank did not take a security interest 
therein, Mr. Arave was indebted to the bank pursuant to an 
agreement where they would loan him the money to rebuild various 
vehicles which he would then sell and repay loans. This has been 
his standard business practice. (T.p.30-48) 
Joe Arave's father made a down payment of $1,900 when the 
car was first purchased for repair and claimed an equitable lien 
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thereon. Following the receipt of testimony, the Honorable VeNoy 
Christofferson entered his memorandum decision in which he found 
that under the totality of circumstances the forfeiture of this 
vehicle would be disproportionate to the actual activity which 
took place. The court took four things into consideration: the 
jurisdictional problem, the use of the car, the equitable 
interest by either the father or the bank, and also the question 
of penalty, and determined that this was not a situation that 
that Legislature had in mind to discourage the illegal 
transportation of contraband. (See memorandum decision page 3) 
The court ruled that the car would not -be forfeited. The state 
appealed from that decision. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Decisions of the trial court will not be disturbed on appeal 
unless totally unsupported by facts or clearly arbitrary arid 
capricious. The trial court's ruling in this case is both 
supported by the facts and the law as it is presently constituted 
in the State of Utah and was not arbitrary and capricious and, 
therefore, should be sustained on appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
It is important for this Court to note that the forfeiture 
sections, §58-37-1 et seq, and §58-36-1 et seq, have been on the 
books for sometime. The law has not been legislatively altered 
or amended since 1971. This Court has reviewed the statute in 
only one case, State of Utah v. One Porsche Two Door, ID number 
9112111026, title number PP1Q026F, bearing Kansas license plate 
number JOR1652, 522 P.2d 917 (1974). In that case, Justice 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-4-
Henroidf in his own inimitable style, attempted to discern the 
legislative intent in adopting the statute. In that case, the 
facts clearer than they are in the instant case. The only 
evidence against the respondent was that he was in his vehicle 
using a controlled substance. There was no evidence that he 
intended to transport it for sale other than the fact that he was 
using it in the car while the car was moving. The Court held 
that in this type of situation, the statute did not intend to 
provide the ultimate penalty of forfeiture. 
The State, in it's brief, seems to suggest that had the 
instant case been before Judge Henroid, he would have found that 
it was the type of case in which the Legislature intended 
forfeiture. Respondent takes issue with that proposition. It is 
important to read the actual language of the Porsche case to get 
the real flavor of what Judge Henroid was saying, to-wit: "This 
section, referring to the forfeiture, as applied to this case 
leads to an unusually harsh result, constituting an additional 
fine or penalty in connection with the misdemeanor. This whole 
case leads to an unconscionable forfeiture and that the trial 
court was correct in concluding that the enormity of the 
forfeiture hardly fit the $299 misdemeanors". Id. at 918 "That 
forfeitures are frowned upon needs no citation of but few 
authorities, since the cases supporting such an elementary 
principle are legion... 
(Quoting from Moran v. Knights), it matters not whether the 
action is one of equity or one of law. The rules of equity must 
prevail. It is no answer for appellant to urge the court's 
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interpretation of the statute was erroneous (as the State is 
alleging here) as the decision of the court is supported by good 
and sufficient reason or'reasons. Id at 918 "The statute can 
obviously can lead to the most absurd results a reason this Court 
consistently is pointed up as a valid reason for invalidation of 
a statute or refusal to apply it under particular facts, making 
such application ridiculous." Id at 919 
It is clear that in the instant case Judge Christofferson 
had read the Porsche decision and, in fact, found from the 
totality of the circumtances the same kinds of difficulties that 
Justice Henroid found in that case. It is clear that the court 
believed this to be an unconscionable forfeiture for a variety of 
reasons, one of which the State did not even address in it's 
brief, the jurisdictional question of whether the State met the 
requirements of Utah Code Annotated §58-36-13, 1953, which 
requires a hearing within twenty (20) days of the filing of an 
answer to the State's Complaint for forfeiture. 
In this case, an answer was timely filed on October 18, 
1984, and through no fault or negligence of the respondent, the 
hearing was not held until February 8, 1985, substantially beyond 
the twenty day period. Although the court did not enforce a 
jurisdictional bar to the case, it did find that there was 
non-compliance by the State and the court with that paragraph. 
Secondly, the court found that in effect it was questionable 
whether the activities described by the undercover agents in this 
case were a sale for profit but was only possession by the 
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respondent, on his own, of a controlled substance and possession 
to turn it over to someone he thought was his friend. Thirdly, 
the court found that there was a question of an equitable 
interest in the car by others other than Mr. Arave, who was the 
owner. The court made reference to the guarantee and down 
payment by the respondent's father and the business relationship 
that the respondent had with the Bank in terms of rebuilding 
cars, making loans, selling the cars and paying the loans off as 
factor which had to be weighed in light of the over-all necessity 
to forfeit. 
The court also found that the quantity of the substance, 
and the extent to which the car had been utilized in the 
transportation of that substance, was disproportionate to the 
$10/000.00 value of the vehicle. In fact, it is interesting that 
the Judge's opening comments in his Memorandum Decision are 
similar to the entire tenor of those made by Justice Henroid, 
eleven (11) years earlier in the Porsche case, when he says "It 
sometimes seems a little bit odd that generally the cars 
involved, as far as the State seeking a forfeiture, involve 
$10,000.00 Pontiac's or Porsche's and $15,000.00 Trans Ams, but 
no $250.00 1970 Chevy's." 
The respondent believes that the court by this somewhat 
tongue-in-cheek statement, has validated Justice Henroid's 
earlier comments. No forfeiture statute is inviolate and the 
trial court, as a court of equity, must look at the entire 
totality of the circumstances to determine if the forfeiture is 
warranted. 
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The court in this case, found that there were a number of 
factors, which made forfeiture, an unconscionable act. 
The respondent agrees with the citation of the case State v. 
Chambers, 533 P.2d 586 (1975) as the basic standard for review in 
this case. If discretion is reasonably used and is not shown to 
have been abused or arbitrary or capricious, then judgment of the 
trial court should not be disturbed. 
The state argues basically four (4) points in support of its 
position that the Judge's decision was arbitrary and capricious. 
The first is whether or not Arave1s action constituted 
distribution or mere possession. Respondent concedes that there 
was some evidence that the car was used by Arave while possessing 
cocaine and at various times, Arave transferred that cocaine to 
an individual who he thought was his friend. The state seems to 
suggest that the statute is a per-se statute, to-wit: That if in 
fact the state makes out a case for distribution by the use of 
the vehicle, that no other evidence needs to be considered and 
the vehicle would be forfeited. Under Justice Henroid's language 
in the Porsche case however, this case is still a case of equity 
and the court can consider other factors, even if it found there 
was a distribution to determine whether or not forfeiture would 
still be allowed. In addition, the Judge in effect, found that 
the evidence was not clear as to whether this was a straight 
distribution or mere possession for ones own use, similar to the 
circumstances in the Porsche case. As such, the state did not 
sustain its burden in this particular instance and the court was 
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justified in using this as one of the reasons for disallowing 
forfeiture. 
With respect to the statefs claim that the amount of 
controlled substance makes no difference, certainly it made some 
difference to Justice Henroid in the Porsche case when he 
commented on the small amount of value of substance versus the 
worth of the vehicle. If in fact it made no difference, why was 
it was even discussed. Again, the state fails to look at this 
statute as one which must be examined in the light of equity and 
if that is done, then these considerations are valid. 
The state further argues that neither the father or Zion's 
First National Bank had an equitable interest. It is clear that 
the Bank had a relationship with Joe Arave, in which he would 
borrow money to rebuild vehicle then sell them to repay the 
loans. It is true that in this specific instance, the state did 
not have a specific lien against the vehicle for a loan, but it 
is also true that the evidence is clear that money was borrowed 
for the purpose of rebuilding this vehicle and the only way Arave 
had to repay the money to the Bank, was by selling the vehicle. 
In addition, the father had paid a down payment on the 
vehicle and had an equitable interest in the property. The fact 
is, the real victims in a forfeiture of this vehicle would be the 
Bank and the father, at least from the evidence presented, 
because Arave would not have the ability to repay the loan or 
repay the money owed to his father. 
The state for some reason, cites §58-37-13 (1) (e) (iii) , as 
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dispositive of the fact that Mr. Arave's father did not have an 
interest in the vehicle by saying that there was no evidence that 
Joe Arave's father could have known, in the exercise of 
reasonable diligence that a violation would take place in use of 
the conveyance. This is the specific language which would bring 
him within the statute and would not allow him to maintain his 
lien. The record is void of any evidence that the father, or for 
that matter, the Bank knew that any violation which involved the 
use of the vehicle was taking place and therefore, arguably, he 
falls within the statute and therefore, the vehicle could not be 
forfeited under that provision. The Judge obviously considered 
this in making his decision. 
The State's last point concerns whether or not the value of 
the vehicle should have any bearing on the decision. Certainly 
in a manner of equity, the value of the vehicle has some bearing 
on the ultimate disposition. The state again, refuses to 
apply principles of equity to this statute, which this Court has 
very clearly, said must be done. The value of the vehicle versus 
the value of the substance used and the value of the transaction 
in a court of equity certainly has some bearing on the ultimate 
decision. 
What is important here, is that the trial court did not 
stress one of these factors as being predominant but, that a 
combination of all of the factors present in this case, satisfied 
the court the forfeiture was not appropriate. This is certainly 
a sustainable decision under the presently existing 
interpretation of the statute set forth in the Porsche case. 
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CONCLUSION 
Respondent respectfully submits Utah Code Annotated 
§58-37 et seq/. is a statute which must be viewed in equitable 
term. The trial court in viewing the matter as one of equity and 
taking the totality of the circumstances into consideration, did 
not abuse its discretion by failing to forfeit the vehicle. The 
state has not sustained it burden on appeal by showing abuse of 
that discretion and therefore, the decision of the lower court 
should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this CJT) J^ day/^ of August, 1985. 
JOHN T\ CAINE 
Attorney for Respondent 
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